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ARTICLE 
WHY THE CATHOLIC MAJORITY 
ON THE SUPREME COURT MAY 
BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
MICHAEL 1. GERHARDT* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I agree with my fellow participants in this Symposium that the fact that 
the current Supreme Court has five Catholics-the most it has ever had at 
one time-is a positive, significant achievement for Catholics in the United 
States; however, I must otherwise dissent. I hasten, at the outset, to empha-
size that there is nothing wrong with the fact that we currently have five 
Catholics on the Supreme Court. To the contrary, I agree the Catholic ma-
jority is strong evidence of many welcome developments: the shattering of 
the glass ceiling impeding Catholics from holding some of the highest pub-
lic offices in the United States, the possible weakening and containment of 
longstanding anti-Catholic bias in our society, and the rise of a vigorous 
Catholic intellectual tradition in the United States. In all likelihood, it is 
also evidence of the disproportionate numbers of Catholics among the small 
group of people from which the last three Republican presidents selected 
their respective Supreme Court nominees. These developments are encour-
aging and noteworthy. but they hardly tell the whole story of how. or why. 
we have a Catholic majority on the Roberts Court. We know, as Sheldon 
Goldman explains. that presidents Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and George 
W. Bush had specific political objectives in making their respective Su-
preme Court appointments; 1 however, the critical question is whether the 
criteria these presidents used to implement their objectives included the 
nominees' conformity with particular religious beliefs or traditions. 
* Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law & Director of the Center on 
Law and Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Law School. B.A., Yale Uni-
versity; M.Sc., London School of Economics; J.D., University of Chicago. This article is based on 
a hypothetical circumstance in which the president made Supreme Court nominations based at 
least in part on the nominees' religious convictions. I appreciate President Bush may not have 
done so. 
1. See Sheldon Goldman in this volume, The Politics of Appointing Catholics to the Federal 
Courts, 4 U. ST. THOMAS LJ. (forthcoming June 2(07). 
173 
174 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:2 
In this Article, I examine two ways in which our national leaders may 
have damaged the rule of law in the course of appointing the current Catho-
lic majority on the Roberts Court. First, in their zeal to control the Court 
through their appointments, our national political leaders may have demon-
strated (perhaps unintentionally) a regrettable lack of faith in the rule of 
law. Their approach to selecting justices possibly evinced an apparent 
agreement with most political scientists who believe that justices do not 
follow the law, that law in the form of precedents does not constrain jus-
tices from either directly voting their policy preferences or manipulating 
precedent to maximize their personal or political preferences. Presidents 
Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and George W. Bush-and many Republican 
senators in 2005-2006-wanted to do what other previous leaders had 
failed to do: end liberal judicial activism, do away with the Supreme Court 
precedents they did not like, and transform the federal courts, particularly 
the Supreme Court, into consistent, if not enduring, conservative bastions. 
To achieve those objectives, they could not depend on the law to constrain 
justices to interpret the Constitution as they preferred. To the contrary, the 
people in charge of selecting Supreme Court nominees had to find justices 
who would rigidly adhere to their ideological preferences, and thus perform 
consistently with the expectations of the dominant social science models of 
the Court. Fulfilling the expectations of the nominating presidents came at 
the expense of our longstanding commitment to-and faith in-the princi-
ple that ours is a government of laws and not of people, even if those people 
had the right kinds of ideological (or religious) commitments. Insisting that 
the maintenance of a government of laws depends on appointing people 
with the right kinds of ideological commitments sacrifices another principle 
on which our faith in our system as a government of laws in tum depends, a 
principle which I call the golden rule of constitutional law: on the Supreme 
Court, justices recognize that they must treat others' precedents as they 
would like their precedents-the ones with which they approve-to be 
treated. Those who purport to speak truth to power must assess the possible 
damage done to the rule of law and the golden rule of constitutional law by 
the repeated insistence that ideology matters more than law. 
A second, serious problem with the process through which we ac-
quired a Catholic majority on the Court may have been that some, if not all, 
of the appointments which made it possible may have been unconstitu-
tional. The selections of at least some of these justices may have been un-
constitutional-possibly violating Article VI's express prohibition of 
religious tests for federal office, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause, or the First Amendment's prohibition against the establishment of 
religion-because they might have been deliberately based in part on the 
nominees' religious convictions. The possible, ensuing violations are all the 
more unfortunate because it would have been easy to assemble a Catholic 
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maJonty on the Court without sacrificing some of our constitutional 
commitments. 
After assessing the possible damage done by the Supreme Court selec-
tion process to the rule of law, I conclude with some modest suggestions for 
future Supreme Court selection. The first is abandoning loaded, or coded, 
rhetoric in public discourse. While President Bush and others may have 
used references to "character" or "heart" to avoid open warfare over recent 
Supreme Court nominations, these references simply empowered the small 
constituency to whom they were addressed. Otherwise, the references possi-
bly deceived, or misled, the rest of the American people. Second, we need 
greater candor in the selection process. Presidents and senators ought to 
specify, as openly as possible, their respective criteria for evaluating Su-
preme Court nominees. If ideology is important to them, they ought to say 
so, and they ought to explain which ideology they prefer and why. If char-
acter matters to them, they need to explain what they mean by character, 
why it ought to be important in Supreme Court (or other judicial) selection, 
and whether "character" as they understand it works to the benefit of nomi-
nees of both parties or only the nominees of one particular party's president. 
Last, but not least, our leaders should take the rule of law seriously and not 
as a convenience. Over the past quarter century, our national leaders have 
often professed their respect for the rule of law-whether it be in the Clin-
ton impeachment proceedings, the policies designed to thwart terrorist at-
tacks against the United States, or the judicial selection process. The rule of 
law includes the Constitution as well as the Court's rulings and the golden 
rule of constitutional law. We expect our justices to respect and to abide by 
the rule of law. We expect our leaders to do the same. The choice of Su-
preme Court justices is no exception, and should be done pursuant to the 
rule of law. Religion should have nothing to do with it. 
II. THE WRONG MESSAGE 
For many years, political scientists have sharply differed with legal 
scholars over the extent to which the law, particularly in the form of judicial 
precedents, actually constrains justices' decision-making in constitutional 
adjudication? If the law actually had the power or force to constrain jus-
tices, then presumably it ought not to matter which people sit on the Court, 
for it would presumably have sufficient force to keep them on the straight 
and narrow. To put this differently, if ours really is a government of laws 
and not people, then it would follow that the leaders of the institutions of 
our federal government, including the Court, would follow the law and not 
their personal or political preferences. Yet, based on extensive empirical 
2. For a basic overview of political scientists' models of the Supreme Court, see SUPREME 
COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 75 (Cornell W. Clayton & How-
ard Gillman eds., 1999). 
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fact-finding, political scientists claim that the justices either directly vote 
their policy preferences or manipulate precedent (and other legal materials) 
to maximize their personal preferences. 
Regardless of whether these findings of political scientists are correct, 
it appears that many presidents and senators may agree with them. In fact, 
presidents have cared about the "politics" of their nominees, and most-if 
not all-presidents have tried to pick people based on how they would 
likely vote on the great constitutional issues of the day? George Washing-
ton was the first (but not the last) president to do this: all fourteen of the 
people he nominated to the Court, including the ten who eventually served 
there, had been selected in part because they had been "reliable, cautious, 
conservative adherents to the Federalist cause" and demonstrated "support 
and advocacy of the Constitution."4 Other presidents have followed suit, 
selecting people who shared their constitutional philosophies. This is, for 
instance, what John Adams did when he appointed John Marshall and the 
"midnight judges" near the end of his presidency (as well as two other Su-
preme Court appointees)-all done to fortify the federal courts with people 
"of strong Federalist persuasion" to overrule or weaken what they regarded 
as the "radical" policies of the Jeffersonians.s Millard Fillmore, too, did this 
when he nominated the first Jew to the Court-Judah Benjamin.6 Benja-
min's being Jewish had little or nothing to do with his nomination. Fillmore 
picked Benjamin because he figured Benjamin shared his constitutional phi-
losophy and the Senate would defer to his nomination since he was a newly 
elected senator from Louisiana and the Senate traditionally deferred to the 
nominations of senators to confirmable offices. As president, William How-
ard Taft (and his Attorney General) closely scrutinized nominees' back-
grounds and beliefs to ensure that all six of his appointees to the Court had 
the right ideological commitments (to protect property rights, among other 
things).? Woodrow Wilson nominated Louis Brandeis in 1916, in spite of, 
rather than because of, the fact that Brandeis was Jewish.8 Wilson liked 
Brandeis' politics. He expected Brandeis to be a progressive force on the 
Court, and Brandeis was. But Brandeis did not get there before enduring an 
intense, six-month-Iong Senate confirmation battle marked by anti-Semi-
tism. When more than a decade later President Hoover had a vacancy to fill, 
he initially resisted Senate pressure to appoint another Jew-Benjamin Car-
3. See LEE EpSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENTS (2005); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL ApPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CON-
STITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (rev. ed. 2003). 
4. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF ApPOINT-
MENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 71, 72 (2d ed. 1985). 
5. [d. at 80. 
6. [d. at Ill. 
7. [d. at 163-73. 
8. [d. at 178-81. 
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dozo.9 Hoover understood that Cardozo was likely to join the progressive 
wing of the Court, but he was concerned that Cardozo's appointment would 
put two New Yorkers and two Jews on the Court, upsetting the geographi-
cal and religious balance of the Court. In the end, Hoover acceded to the 
will of the Senate. Subsequently, Franklin Delano Roosevelt picked nine 
justices based in part on their proven commitment to upholding the consti-
tutionality of the New Deal. 10 
Since 1980, all three Republican presidents have expressed the same 
desire to appoint justices committed to thwarting liberal judicial activism, 
construing congressional powers narrowly, weakening-if not overturn-
ing-Roe v. Wade,l1 lowering or dismantling the wall of separation be-
tween church and state, and strengthening protection of private property 
rights. Their collective quest has been to devise flawless criteria for identi-
fying people who had, would maintain, and would rigidly follow their pre-
ferred ideological commitments over time. 12 
Looking at the patterns in the past three Republican presidents' Su-
preme Court nominations provides further insights into their criteria for 
ending the liberal judicial activism with which they associated the Court, 
and for producing a Court with a majority to rule as they preferred. First, 
five of the last eight Republican appointees to the Court-and seven of the 
last eleven Republican Supreme Court nominees-had extensive experi-
ence in the executive branch. 13 Second, all eight of the last eight Republi-
can Supreme Court appointees-and ten of the last eleven Republican 
Supreme Court nominees-had been sitting judges prior to their nomina-
tions to the Court. 14 Third, five of the last eight Republican Supreme Court 
9. Id. at 201-05. 
lO. Id. at 206-36. 
11. 4lO U.S. 113 (1973). 
12. See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional 
Power: Presidential Influences and Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363 (2003) (describing 
the concerted efforts and consequences of President Reagan to transfonn the Supreme Court). 
13. The last eleven Republican nominees to the Court and their respective executive experi-
ence have been John Roberts (Deputy Solicitor General, Associate White House Counsel, and 
Assistant to the Attorney General); Samuel Alito, Jr. (assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. At-
torney, and Deputy Assistant Attorney General); Harriet Miers (Chief White House Counsel); 
Clarence Thomas (assistant secretary); David Souter (New Hampshire Attorney General); 
Anthony Kennedy (no fonnal executive experience); Robert Bork (Solicitor General); Douglas 
Ginsburg (Assistant Attorney General); Antonin Scalia (Assistant Attorney General); William 
Rehnquist as Chief Justice (Assistant Attorney General); Sandra Day O'Connor (no federal execu-
tive experience but brief stint as county attorney). 
14. The ten Republican nominees and their respective federal judicial experience have been 
John Roberts (judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia); Samuel Alito, Jr. 
(judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit); Clarence Thomas (judge on the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia); David Souter (judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit); Robert Bork and Douglas Ginsburg (both judges on the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia); Anthony Kennedy (judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit); Antonin Scalia (judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia); 
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appointees were Catholic, and Republican presidents appointed all five of 
the current Catholic majority on the Court. 15 
While President Clinton named two justices whom he expected would 
support a right of privacy, including Roe,16 President George W. Bush set 
out, clearly and deliberately, to do the opposite. He was anxious not to 
make the mistake his father had made in choosing David Souter, who has 
become reviled among conservative Republicans as a traitor for becoming 
one of the Court's most liberal justices. President Bush vowed to appoint 
"strict constructionists" and hinted his appointees would be modeled after 
justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. President Bush made no se-
cret his nominees would have the right kind of ideological commitments. 
Interestingly, he made four nominations to the Court-John Roberts twice, 
Harriet Miers, and Samuel Alito, Jr.-and all four had significant executive 
branch experience and strong religious convictions. No doubt, the prior ex-
ecutive experience of these nominees-like that of former nominees like 
Robert Bork, Douglas Ginsburg, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and 
William Rehnquist-might have been relevant because it might have made 
the nominees more sympathetic to executive branch claims (and conceiva-
bly more dubious about congressional ones) and enabled the president and 
others responsible for judicial selection to get to know their personal ideo-
logical commitments based on first-hand, daily interaction. 
Many Republican senators expressly applauded Roberts's and Alito's 
respective track records of demonstrated ideological commitments. It was 
no accident that John Roberts and Samuel Alito Jr. were on the short lists of 
many conservative interest groups which had been monitoring prospective 
nominees to the Court for the right kinds of ideological commitments. 
When White House spokespersons, including President Bush, were pushed 
by several Republican senators and the press to defend the nomination of 
Harriet Miers, they responded in part by praising her character and empha-
sizing their confidence she would remain committed to being the kind of 
justice the president had promised to appoint. Similarly, Senator Michael 
DeWine (R-OH) expressed pleasure that confmning Alito would bury the 
Bork precedent and instead show that the Senate will confirm someone with 
a "conservative" judicial philosophy. When Senator Sam Brownback, 
among others, publicly said that he cared more about a nominee's judicial 
philosophy than their professional accomplishments, he was implying that 
William Rehnquist (Associate Justice of the Supreme Court); and Sandra Day O'Connor (state 
appellate court judge in Arizona). 
15. The five Catholic justices of the Roberts Court and the presidents who appointed them 
are John Roberts (President George W. Bush); Samuel Alito, Jr. (President George W. Bush); 
Antonin Scalia (President Reagan); Clarence Thomas (President George H.W. Bush); and 
Anthony Kennedy (President Reagan). Justice Thomas did not convert to Catholicism until after 
his appointment to the Court. 
16. President Clinton'S two appointees were, of course, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and 
Stephen Breyer. 
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the law, on its own, could not constrain someone to decide cases the right 
way unless that person had the right ideological commitments. Indeed, why 
else would President Bush not have nominated people to the Court who 
happened to be politically liberal or active Democrats? The answer is obvi-
ous-the nominees' judicial philosophies were indispensable to their 
selection. 
While President Bush and the Republican Senate (as well as their 
Democratic colleagues and predecessors in office) may not have done any-
thing particularly unique in selecting justices whom they believed had par-
ticular ideological commitments, their preoccupation with the ideological 
purity of their nominees is likely to have produced, or exacerbated, several 
unintended consequences. Perhaps most importantly, it might have signaled 
to the American people that they believe ours is not a government of laws 
but rather a government of people with the right kinds of ideological com-
mitments. Picking justices who share particular judicial philosophies has 
had the further unintended consequence of confirming the long-held view 
of political scientists that individual justices' ideological commitments con-
strain their decision-making much more than the law or those things pur-
porting to be law. Whether political scientists are right that justices vote 
their policy preferences directly, or manipulate the law to maximize those 
preferences, is a different matter than whether presidents and many senators 
happen to believe that is how justices behave. 
Some readers might be quick to point out that presidents (and senators) 
are committed to the law but have had to adapt to the fact that many justices 
are not. They might argue that President Bush understood that only nomi-
nees with the right kind of ideological commitments would follow the law. 
He may have understood that he would need to take ideology into account 
to counterbalance the disposition of several justices to follow their personal 
preferences rather than the law. Indeed, one could argue it would have been 
irresponsible for the president or senators to ignore this disposition or to fail 
to protect against it. 
This response is unavailing, however, and the signaling of apparent 
presidential and senatorial agreement that law matters less than ideology 
remains problematic for at least two reasons. First, preoccupation with ide-
ology to ensure supposed fidelity to the law hardly began with President 
Bush. There never was some past, golden era in which justices, presidents, 
and senators approached their respective jobs differently than they do now. 
Conservatives and liberals and Republicans and Democrats are mistaken if 
they think any of them is responsible for initiating presidents' or senators' 
preoccupations with ideology. The fact is that presidents and senators have 
always believed ideology matters. As I have suggested, the preoccupation 
with ideology traces back to George Washington, and it includes not only 
the presidents whose appointments I have described but other noteworthy 
ones, including Abraham Lincoln, whose principal concern in appointing 
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five justices was "the effect a proposed Court member might have on the 
conduct of the war."17 
Nevertheless, we have to be careful with the inferences we draw from 
this historical pattern. Presidents and senators usually do not take ideology 
into account because they know justices will disregard the law. They take 
ideology into account because they know-but rarely have political incen-
tives for acknowledging-that constitutional law is different than other law. 
It is not just that the Constitution is the "supreme law of the land" that 
makes it different. Constitutional law is different because the Constitu-
tion-its principal (and, many believe, only) constituent-is unusually in-
determinate. The indeterminacy of constitutional law confounds (many) 
political scientists to no end, but it is indeterminate for many reasons which 
are understandable to legal scholars (and to the justices and our political 
leaders). 
First, constitutional law is indeterminate because of the nature of the 
Constitution. A written constitution, like other laws reduced to writing, 
must be abstract; it must speak in "broad outlines" and generalities as Chief 
Justice Marshall famously suggested.I8 The abstractness of a written consti-
tution, coupled with its failures to prescribe a preferred mode of interpreta-
tion, limit its ability to guide concrete decisions taken in its name, and 
increase the likelihood of unpredictability in its construction. Second, sev-
eral practical problems exacerbate the indeterminacy of constitutional law. 
The Framers and Ratifiers failed to anticipate every contingency, they often 
failed to reach consensus on more specific language, and they agreed on 
general terms for different, often complex reasons. As Michael Dorf ex-
plains, the difficulty of achieving consensus on more specific language in 
the Constitution "is particularly problematic for constitutional interpreta-
tion. Given profound disagreement, any foundational set of procedures or 
principles sufficiently abstract to secure consensus and thereby work its 
way into a popularly chosen constitution will be too abstract to resolve the 
most acute subsequently arising constitutional controversies."19 
The text of the Constitution is, however, not the only source of consti-
tutional meaning that is open-ended, lacks consensus on rules for its con-
struction, and is amenable to multiple interpretations. Similarly, the 
structure of the Constitution raises inferences, but the Constitution does not 
dictate which inferences ought to be controlling. In a classic dispute that has 
existed at least as long as the Constitution, some people support construing 
the Constitution as setting forth the maximum range of areas in which the 
branches may share power, while others argue that the Constitution limits 
17. ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 116. 
18. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (stating that a 
constitution's "nature ... requires, that only its great outlines should be marked .... "). 
19. Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 
884 (2003). 
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only how much power may be shared by the heads of each branch but not 
how much may overlap or be shared by officials operating below the 
apexes. In another longstanding (and ultimately bloodier) dispute, authori-
ties disagreed over the areas in which the federal government is supreme to 
the states, as well as the scope of state sovereignty protected by the Consti-
tution. The open-ended language of the Constitution, as well as the infer-
ences raised by the Constitution's design, lend themselves to several 
plausible interpretations; however, the Constitution provides no guidance 
on how it ought to be interpreted, much less on which one of several plausi-
ble interpretations is superior. 
Moreover, original meaning is susceptible to more than one interpreta-
tion (and to some manipulation)?O People may disagree over whose under-
standings are relevant for determining original meaning, how the plain 
meaning of the Constitution ought to be determined, how the popular or 
common understanding of the Constitution at the time of ratification ought 
to be determined, at what level of generality original meaning ought to be 
defined, and how many Framers and Ratifiers need to have agreed on an 
understanding for it to qualify as a component of original meaning. These 
questions are difficult to answer because there are no rules for interpreters 
or those committed to originalism to follow in divining original meaning?! 
My purpose in raising the indeterminacy of some sources of constitu-
tional meaning is not to suggest that anything goes-or ought to go-when 
it comes to interpreting the Constitution. There are significant checks on the 
Court's, as well as other institutions', constitutional decision-making. One 
check is the gatekeeping function of presidents and senators, who keep each 
other (as well as the Court) in check. They determine which views ought to 
be reflected, or which ought not to be reflected, on the Court; and they 
perform this function because the law-the Constitution-empowers them 
to exercise it. In practice, presidents and senators gravitate toward nominees 
not only whom they know, but also who fall within and reflect the main-
stream of constitutional thought. Presidents do this because they know such 
nominees are likelier to be confirmed as opposed to those with radical 
views, while senators do this because they figure such nominees are likelier 
to maintain, or at least pose no serious threat to, the constitutional status 
quo. If, for example, nominees have shown (and seemed disposed to show) 
disdain for very well-settled precedents and constitutional doctrine, they 
will encounter more difficulty in being confirmed because many, if not 
most, senators will infer from their disdain a general disrespect for the law 
and for maintaining stability, consistency, and predictability in constitu-
tional law. When the Senate confirmed Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
20. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CER-
TAINTY; THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002) (arguing that no one 
unified theory explains constitutional law, despite attempts to formulate such a theory). 
21. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REv. 659 (1987). 
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Alito, there was no majority of senators expressly supporting their appoint-
ments because they believed these nominees promised radical changes in 
constitutional law. Some Republicans and many Democrats expressly ap-
proved the nominations because they found the nominees had shown proper 
respect for precedent and the law. The Senate approved two nominees who 
purported to be in, and to reflect, the mainstream of constitutional law as it 
at least stood in the years in which they were confirmed. 
Another significant check on the Court occurs within the Court. This 
check is an essential dynamic of constitutional adjudication obscured (per-
haps purposefully) by the efforts of public leaders to shape public opinion 
over particular Supreme Court nominations. This dynamic is the golden rule 
of constitutional law in which the justices appreciate that, once on the 
Court, they must treat the precedent of others as they would like others to 
treat the precedents they approve. This golden rule is as old as the Court 
(indeed, far older than the Court). It helps to explain why, inter alia, so 
much constitutional law endures. The golden rule of constitutional law as-
sures there is not a lot of backsliding in constitutional doctrine. For in-
stance, the Court continues to stand by most of the fundamental rights and 
the expansions of federal power it has recognized. Hence, the Court's with-
drawal of its recognition of a right to contract as a fundamental right22 was 
unusual in that it has stood by many other fundamental rights it has recog-
nized (such as the rights to marry,23 to one man-one vote,24 and to not being 
coerced into sending their children to public schools25); and its recent cut-
backs in the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power are relatively 
few and far between,26 especially since Congress could use other powers to 
accomplish the same ends?7 
It is natural to wonder what this discussion about indeterminacy has to 
do with President Bush's and other leaders' unwitting, or unintended, sig-
naling of their agreement with political scientists that the law does not mat-
ter to (at least some) Supreme Court justices. The short answer is that they 
have many incentives to curry favor with, and play to, their bases and few 
(if any) incentives to engage in protracted discussions of the nuances of 
constitutional law in public discourse. This incentive structure is likely to 
22. The right to contract was most famously recognized in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
(1905). By 1937, the Court had reduced the level of scrutiny it had used to examine the constitu-
tionality of economic regulation from strict scrutiny to the rational basis test. See, e.g., West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
23. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
24. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
25. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925). 
26. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000). 
27. For instance, the Court has generally deferred to the conditions Congress attaches to its 
spending measures, including ones requiring states to abandon particular prerogatives. See gener-
ally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
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remain unchanged, except perhaps in periods of divided government in 
which presidents and senators are likelier to press each other harder to be-
come more candid about what they are doing and to cease obfuscating the 
stakes through misleading platitudes. 
This situation leaves others, especially academics, interested in speak-
ing truth to power, with the opportunity (and responsibility) of keeping our 
leaders in check. Law professors should not allow presidents, senators, or 
others to get away with obscuring their priorities in judicial appointments or 
undermining respect for the rule of law, including the golden rule of consti-
tutionallaw. If law professors do not believe that the law is meaningless in 
constitutional adjudication, they should say so. If they believe that prece-
dents or the golden rule of constitutional law matters, they should say so. 
And, if they disagree with political scientists who maintain that ideology 
matters more than law in determining outcomes in constitutional adjudica-
tion, they should not remain silent, particularly when political leaders ap-
pear to be expressing agreement with the political scientists. When law 
professors sign letters-or take public positions-opposing nominees be-
cause of their ideology, they need to explain how their opposition squares 
with their respect for (and fidelity to) the rule of law. Any law professors 
who believe, like I do, that constitutional adjudication and interpretation are 
more complex than our leaders or many political scientists allow, should 
express themselves accordingly. And if legal scholars are committed to 
speaking truth to power, they should not conduct themselves in accordance 
with the view that the law is meaningless unless they agree with that per-
spective. When scholars speak truth to power, we have a responsibility to 
expose obfuscations in public discourse, to be candid about the justifica-
tions or consequences of particular decisions, and to expose misdirection 
for what it is (unless we approve the misdirection and have the courage and 
candor to explain why). 
Up until this point, the relevance of the current majority's religious 
faith might not be, however, apparent. In the next part, I explain why the 
nominees' faith may have had something to do with their ideological com-
mitments and been instrumental to their selection. 
III. WHY THE CATHOLIC MAJORITY ON THE ROBERTS COURT MAY 
BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The second longest period in our history without a vacancy arising on 
the Court just came to an end. It occurred in the time between Justice 
White's departure from the Court in 1994 and Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
death in 2005. During this period, party tensions intensified over the pros-
pect of one or two openings arising on the Court, and President George W. 
Bush and his advisers anxiously prepared to make the most of the opportu-
nities they expected to have to tip the Court's balance further to the right. 
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For five years, President George W. Bush and his counselors labored to 
solve the puzzle of how to pick justices who would remain rigidly commit-
ted to the course of decision-making they preferred. They understood that 
nominees' talking the talk was an insufficient basis for ensuring that nomi-
nees had and would faithfully adhere to the right kinds of ideological com-
mitments over time. President Bush's apparent solution was to pick people 
with rock-solid moral character, including (as we shall see) deep-rooted re-
ligious convictions. The challenge was to find people who outwardly lived 
their convictions, who exhibited consciences morally bound by their 
church's fundamental and official teachings,28 and whose characters were 
inextricably linked to and defined by moral faith-and thus were incorrupti-
ble, hostile to liberal values, and rigidly opposed to jurisprudential or philo-
sophicallaxity. In this regard, justices Scalia and Thomas were models not 
just because of their jurisprudential outlooks, but also their moral characters 
in which their respective constitutional outlooks were firmly grounded (if 
not derived). 
While it may not be readily apparent why the president's or senators' 
selection criteria may have been unconstitutional, it should become clearer 
once I sketch some possible constitutional limits on the selection process 
and how the current Catholic majority would likely apply these limitations. 
First, Article VI of the Constitution expressly provides that "no religious 
Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust 
under the United States."29 The second possible limitation is the Fifth 
Amendment,30 which subjects federal governmental action to strict scrutiny 
if it is expressly based on a suspect classification such as race. Yet another 
possible limitation may be the First Amendment, which prohibits any law 
"respecting an establishment of religion.'»! Thus, President Bush and his 
counselors might have acted unconstitutionally if they had a "religious test" 
for Supreme Court selection or based Supreme Court nominations on either 
religious affiliation (thereby furthering the establishment of religion) or a 
suspect classification (requiring the application of strict scrutiny). 
28. I am grateful to Steve Shiffrin for calling my attention to two Catholic traditions, one 
conSisting of those accepting the Magisterium's precepts (assuming they and their levels of au-
thority are known) as morally binding in conscience and the other regarding it as the right and 
duty of Catholics to follow their consciences when it is contrary to the Magisterium. See LINDA 
HOGAN, CONFRONTING THE TRUTH: CoNSCIENCE IN THE CATHOLIC TRADITION (2000); CON-
SCIENCE: READINGS IN MORAL THEOLOGY No. 14 (Charles E. Curran ed., 2004). It is possible that 
President Bush (and his advisers) may have gravitated toward Roberts and Alito as nominees 
because they are, in effect, what some call "Vatican Catholics," while the president may have had 
confidence in Miers because she adhered to an analogous religiOUS tradition requiring her to ob-
jectively manifest her adherence to certain religious precepts consistent with certain constitutional 
outcomes and positions. For some interesting statistics on political and other attitudes of contem-
porary Catholics in the United States, see ANDREW GREELEY, THE CATHOLIC REVOLUTION: NEW 
WINE, OLD WINESKINS, AND THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL (2004). 
29. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
30. Id. amend. V. 
31. Id. amend. 1. 
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The constitutional problems with the selection process may become 
clearer if we examine how the Roberts Court, including its Catholic major-
ity, would assess the constitutionality of an expressed preference for either 
Catholics or nominees with particular religious convictions. First, consider 
how the plain meaning approach might work here. Justice Scalia insists, for 
example, on adhering to the plain meaning of the text of the Constitution; 
and Article VI, by its plain language, straightforwardly prohibits religious 
tests for federal office. Indeed, it is hard to imagine clearer constitutional 
language than that which appears in Article VP2-it categorically restricts 
religious tests, just as the Sixth Amendment categorically requires confron-
tation of witnesses in every criminal prosecution, a prohibition Justice 
Scalia maintains should be construed as written as an absolute prohibition 
applicable expressly to "all criminal prosecutions," regardless of the 
circumstances.33 
It is possible that some justices may consider construing the "religious 
test" language of Article VI more narrOWly. Some might argue, for exam-
ple, that Article VI should be construed only as a restriction on formally 
requiring candidates to federal offices to pledge fidelity to a particular faith. 
The difficulty with this construction is that it may be hard to reconcile with 
the plain meaning of the clause and some justices' adherence to the plain 
meaning of the Constitution in other contexts (such as in the Freedom of 
Speech and Confrontation Clause cases). 
To further appreciate how the Catholic majority would likely analyze 
the constitutionality of a selection scheme like that which (might have) pro-
duced it, it may be useful to consider how the five Catholic justices would 
analyze a case in which everyone selected for a particular federal job (say, a 
contractor) was African-American. This outcome could be attributable to 
three possible schemes. First, all African-Americans were chosen explicitly 
on the basis of their race, in which case the Court would subject the selec-
tion scheme to strict scrutiny and uphold it only if it had a compelling justi-
fication. Second, all African-Americans were chosen on the basis of neutral 
criteria, but the selection scheme had a disproportionate racial impact, in 
which case the Court would follow Washington v. Davis34 to subject that 
scheme only to the rational basis test in the absence of proof it was adopted 
because of, rather in spite of, the disproportionate impact it had.35 Third, the 
African-Americans were chosen pursuant to a scheme in which race was 
one of many factors. For the current Catholic majority, two of these three 
schemes are unconstitutional, particularly if it were to subject the third 
scheme to strict scrutiny along the lines of the reasoning in the dissent in 
32. [d. art. VI. 
33. /d. amend. VI; see, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). 
34. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
35. See Personnel Adm'r. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
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Grutter v. Bollinger.36 The current majority would not need to overrule 
Grutter in order to employ this analysis, since the analysis is the same, and 
thus analogous to the level of scrutiny, as employed by the Court in such 
earlier cases as Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,37 and City of Richmond 
v. l.A. Croson CO.38 
Replacing race with religion is likely to produce the same outcome 
under the Fifth Amendment. For at least some justices, religion may consti-
tute a suspect basis for a classification scheme. Say, for example, a law 
required that at least five seats on the Court be set aside for Jews. Such a 
classification would likely satisfy most if not all the factors recognized by 
the Court for establishing suspect classifications, including, but not limited 
to, being the product of bigotry or prejudice and stereotyping. If a religion-
based classification scheme were subject to strict scrutiny, the Court would 
unlikely recognize compelling justifications for it. 
Though some justices might use rational basis rather than heightened 
scrutiny because of their preference to use strict scrutiny only for race-
based classifications, they might still strike the religious-based classifica-
tion down. The reason is that they might be disposed to conclude that a 
classification based expressly on adherence to one religious faith or a set of 
religious convictions reflects animus or prejudice toward other religions. 
They might find no plausible justification for a classification scheme that 
disqualifies many otherwise qualified people from consideration simply be-
cause of their religious faiths. 
If we were to analyze the constitutionality of the nominations of Chief 
Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and Harriet Miers under the framework out-
lined above, the outcome should be obvious. Once again, there are only 
three possibilities: first, if we assume the president chose all three explicitly 
on the basis of their religion, the nominations would violate the plain mean-
ing of Article VI's prohibition of religious tests and would trigger either 
strict scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment or fail the rational basis test. 
There is no conceivable compelling justification for basing Supreme Court 
selections on someone's being Catholic. Nor, for that matter, is there a plau-
sible justification (at least that a Court might be inclined to approve) for 
disqualifying large numbers of otherwise qualified people for a seat on the 
Court because of their religious faiths. 
Second, a scheme in which all three nominees were chosen from a 
small group of qualified nominees (set apart by shared judicial philoso-
phies) pursuant to some neutral criteria, is probably not constitutionally 
problematic. Under the latter circumstances, Washington v. Davis (and its 
progeny) would likely control. In the absence of evidence that the justices 
36. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
37. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
38. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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were chosen in spite of rather than because of a discriminatory impact, their 
selections would likely be subjected only to the rational basis test and easily 
pass muster. 
Third, if the president and senators used religion or religious convic-
tions as one of many factors in their selection, the question is whether the 
Court might treat the selection criteria as suspect. If so, the nominations 
would fail to pass constitutional muster. If, however, justices treated the 
selection system as not suspect, they would have to show how the selection 
scheme differs from the one which they subjected to strict scrutiny in Grut-
ter. If they could not make the latter showing, they would have to strike the 
scheme down. Hence, there is a good chance that two of the three possible 
selection schemes under which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were 
nominated may have been unconstitutional. 
As I have suggested, however, some justices (perhaps justices Scalia 
and Thomas) might treat the selection in Grutter as race-based and thus 
triggering strict scrutiny but the scheme used to select the Catholic majority 
as non-race-based and thus triggering only the rational basis test. Even if 
this were to happen, there might still be a majority on the Court disposed to 
strike the selection scheme down. It is easy to imagine other justices-
justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg, for example-joining at 
least some of the new Catholic majority to strike down such a classification 
scheme for violating the First Amendment's prohibition against the estab-
lishment of religion, the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component, or 
maybe both. Recall that at least until recently there was a majority on the 
Court committed to striking down laws that a majority found endorsed re-
ligion, and a selection scheme that gives explicit preference to religious 
beliefs or affiliation plainly endorses at least some religion.39 A similar ma-
jority might be persuaded to strike down a law expressly favoring religion 
as violating the Fifth Amendment because it lacked either a compelling 
justification (as a suspect classification) or at least the neutral basis that the 
rational basis test requires.4O 
The only remaining question is which of the three possible scenarios 
President Bush's Supreme Court nominations fits into (and which, if any of 
the schemes, the selections of justices Scalia and Thomas may fall into as 
well). Some evidence suggests the possibility of either the first or third of 
these scenarios, both of which involve arguably unconstitutional selection 
schemes. First, recall some suggestive statistics: all five of the current Cath-
olic majority of the Court were appointed by Republican presidents deter-
mined to lower the wall of separation between church and state (and to 
weaken Roe). Perhaps more tellingly, President Bush's four nominees to the 
39. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
40. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996). 
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Court-John Roberts twice, Harriet Miers, and Samuel Alito Jr.-had at 
least two things in common: all four had substantial experience in the exec-
utive branch and all four had strong Christian convictions. 
If these statistics do not shift the burden of persuasion to the adminis-
tration, then we can turn to stronger, more direct evidence of unconstitu-
tional behavior-the candid admissions of the president and his advisers. It 
is rare for a president or his counselors to speak as openly as they did about 
Harriet Miers, but what they said was significant: the fIrst thing President 
Bush's close counselor, Karl Rove, publicly said about Miers's nomination 
was that she was an Evangelical Christian and that this fact ought to ap-
pease Christian conservatives concerned about her ideological commit-
ments. He was quoted as mentioning this in telephone conversations with 
interested and concerned interest group leaders. particularly those from con-
servative Christian organizations that had helped to vet prospective nomi-
nees to the Court. (We can only imagine what he may have said in private, 
non-telephonic conversations.) The president said that he knew Harriet 
Miers's "heart" and was confIdent that she would be the same person 
twenty years from now as she was now. One of Miers's fIercest defenders, 
Nathan Hecht of the Texas Supreme Court, spoke publicly at the White 
House's urging about Miers's religious conversion, the strength of her cur-
rent faith, and his confIdence that on the all-important question of Roe her 
faith would make it impossible for her to do anything other than to vote to 
reverse Roe. 
Maybe those people who do not want to believe a president (or at least 
this president) could act unconstitutionally dismiss these comments, or take 
them to mean something different than what they possibly suggest. They 
might believe that holding the right kinds of moral commitments to judging 
might coincide with holding particular religious beliefs, rather than the 
other way around. We know, however, that President Bush cared about 
Miers's religion, because he and others in his administration told us so. We 
know many Republican senators supporting Chief Justice Roberts and Jus-
tice Alito repeatedly praised their "characters" and "hearts" -terms loaded 
with meaning, standing, in all likelihood, for how these senators expected 
the nominees to rule once they were on the Court. We know President Bush 
was looking for nominees with judicial philosophies grounded in something 
impervious to change; he was looking for nominees whose judicial philoso-
phies were not just manifestations of abstract commitments but rather were 
consistent with-if not grounded in, and inextricably linked to-certain 
other, unshakeable moral commitments. He may have wanted nominees 
who did not internalize their religious faith but rather attempted to live out-
wardly in accordance with particular religious traditions;41 people, in other 
words, with a certain kind of moral character, which required resisting both 
41. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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changing attitudes, and currying favor with the liberal elite. President Bush 
wanted people, as he suggested about Miers, who would remain rigidly 
committed to certain moral values for all time. President Bush picked Su-
preme Court nominees who, he had good reason to believe, lived their 
faiths as he lives his faith, who objectively manifested moral characters 
(and beliefs and conduct) consistent with conservative constitutional con-
struction, and who would be morally repulsed by the kind of judging that 
led to upholding abortion rights, to restricting school prayer, and to skepti-
cism of strong, unilateral executive action. If the nominees' religious per-
sonas were pertinent as evidence, or proof, that they had the right kinds of 
moral characters or commitments in order to be nominated to the Court 
(and not the other way around), then it seems that he and his staff may have 
acted unconstitutionally. 
IV. THE NEXT TIME 
It is naIve to think that politics does not inform presidents' Supreme 
Court nominations. Of course it does. The issue is not whether presidents 
try to fulfill certain political objectives with their appointments to the Court, 
but rather how they may (and do) seek to fulfill such objectives. The ques-
tion is how they may do this without running into particular constitutional 
difficulties. 
The first thing to keep in mind is that the Constitution, including Arti-
cle VI, applies as much to the president as it does to the Congress. But, in 
the context of judicial appointments, the president must still adhere to Arti-
cle VI but without the likely prospect of judicial review. A president's ap-
proach to judicial selection is a prime example of the Constitution outside 
the Court. Just because the Court declines to review the president's actions 
does not mean the president may do whatever he wants, regardless of what 
the Constitution says. It means, instead, that different checks are available 
to keep him in line. We saw some of those checks employed in response to 
the administration's apparently express consideration of Miers's religious 
faith as a basis for her nomination to the Court. No sooner had White House 
officials spoken publicly of her religion in support of her nomination than 
more than a few newspapers around the country, legal scholars, and sena-
tors from both parties responded with concern that the administration may 
have violated Article VI's prohibition of the use of religious tests for office. 
The president withdrew the nomination for many reasons, possibly includ-
ing the desire not to protract the conflict generated by his administration's 
apparently explicit consideration of religion as a positive factor in the nomi-
nation process. 
Checks and balances, even with the Supreme Court selection process, 
require the willingness of each branch not only to operate within its respec-
tive constitutional boundaries but also to monitor the other branches and to 
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keep them in check. Keeping each other in check depends in tum on the 
branches' awareness of what each other is doing, or not doing. Hence, 
Miers's fate is a reminder of the facts that the enforcement of Article VI 
generally depends on our political leaders' awareness of what each other is 
doing. If President Bush had not publicized his selection criteria, it would 
have been purely a matter of speculation whether, or to what extent, he took 
religion into consideration in making his Supreme Court nominations. But 
once he made his reliance on, or consideration of, religion known, other 
public authorities could respond accordingly. Previously when, as Sheldon 
Goldman reminds us, President Eisenhower explicitly directed his Attorney 
General to find a qualified Catholic for the COurt,42 senators could suspect 
(or maybe acquiesce) in his express consideration of William Brennan's 
Catholicity as a positive factor in support of his nomination to the Court. 
Any of us who are skeptical whenever government explicitly uses race or 
gender as a basis for a selection scheme should not let presidents or senators 
off the hook. As commentators did with the Miers nomination, we should 
not hesitate to speak truth to power that somewhere within the circum-
stances under consideration, the Constitution may have been sacrificed, 
even if it was done inadvertently or unnecessarily. 
Speaking truth to power is important as a check on the selection pro-
cess in two other ways. The first is that it is needed to expose hidden or 
coded messages in public rhetoric. While the president and others may have 
used references to "character" or "heart" to avoid open warfare over recent 
Supreme Court nominations, I suspect these references were not chosen by 
happenstance. They had special meanings to people in the know (partly 
informed, no doubt, by private communications with the White House and 
talking points distributed by the White House or people close to the White 
House). Law professors, among others, had a special responsibility to deci-
pher the rhetoric, especially if we knew if it had been intended to mislead 
and distract the public and the Senate from the primary objectives of the 
nominations. While these references may have helped to diffuse or deflect 
conflict, they did so at the expense of furthering people's distrust in their 
government. Coded rhetoric simply empowers the people in the know-the 
small constituency to whom the coded rhetoric was addressed. Otherwise, 
the references may have deceived the rest of the American people into 
thinking that maybe judicial ideology or philosophy may not have had 
much to do with the nominations when they may have been first-order se-
lection criterion. Even for the public, which expected (maybe hoped) the 
administration would take judicial ideology into account, the coded rhetoric 
precludes them from praising these nominations for shifting the Court fur-
ther to the right. The president and others will have a hard time claiming the 
significance of these nominations in terms of their judicial outlooks when 
42. See Goldman, supra note 1. 
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they made every effort not to defend, or explain, them in ideological or 
philosophical terms. 
Speaking truth to power is perhaps most important as a check, albeit 
not a terribly strong one, to ensure greater candor in the selection process. 
Presidents and senators ought to specify, as openly as possible, their respec-
tive criteria for evaluating Supreme Court nominees. Since presidents and 
senators employ particular criteria, then they should say so. Sunlight, as 
Justice Brandeis liked to say, is the best disinfectant. Whatever the criteria 
may be, senators and the public ought to know, so they may evaluate the 
criteria. If ideology is important to our leaders, they ought to say so, and 
they ought to explain which ideology they prefer and why. If character mat-
ters to them, they need to explain what they mean by character, why it 
ought to be important in Supreme Court (or other judicial) selection, and 
whether "character," as they understand it, works to the benefit of nominees 
of both parties or only the nominees they like. 
Last but not least, our leaders should take the rule of law seriously. It 
is not a convenience. Over the past quarter century, our national leaders 
have often professed their respect for the rule of law-whether it be in the 
Clinton impeachment proceedings, the policies designed to thwart terrorism 
in the United States, or the judicial selection process. The rule of law in-
cludes the Constitution as well as the Court's rulings and the golden rule of 
constitutional law, which requires granting the same degree of respect for 
the precedents of others, which we would like to see given to those we like. 
We expect all our leaders, not just those on the Supreme Court, to abide by 
the rule of law. The choice of Supreme Court justices is no exception. It 
should be done pursuant to the rule of law, which requires that nominees' 
religions are incidental to, not the basis for, their nominations to the Su-
preme Court. 
*** 
I close with a challenge. I may be wrong; I actually hope that I am. 
But, ask yourselves whether you agree with the scholars and the politicians 
who maintain that moral character ought to be the basis for Supreme Court 
selection. If you agree with them, then ask whether your understanding of 
the appropriate moral character for appointment to the Court is broad 
enough to include people who construe the Constitution differently than 
you do. If not, then you may have to recognize that for you moral character 
is a proxy for something else-judicial ideology, in all likelihood-and that 
you apparently do not believe, for whatever reason, that the law has the 
capacity to keep justices in line. For law can only matter-or at least it most 
matters-when it does not have to depend on the politics of the people who 
are charged with its enforcement or interpretation. If, however, your con-
ception of the requisite moral character for Supreme Court nominees does 
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not favor people with particular sets of political beliefs or judicial ideolo-
gies, then you may believe that law, at least sometimes, does matter, and 
that it has the capacity, at least sometimes, to constrain interpreters, regard-
less of their political convictions. The choice as to which conception of 
moral character is pertinent to Supreme Court selection is for the president 
to make but for all of us (including the Senate) to evaluate. 
